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Economic assessment of acquiring water for 
environmental ﬂows in the Murray Basin*
 





This article is an economic analysis of reallocating River Murray Basin water from
agriculture to the environment with and without the possibility of interregional water
trade. Acquiring environmental ﬂows as an equal percentage of water allocations from
all irrigation regions in the Basin is estimated to reduce returns to irrigation. When
the same volume of water is taken from selected low-value regions only, the net revenue
reduction is less. In all scenarios considered, net revenue gains from freeing trade are
estimated to outweigh the negative revenue effects of reallocating water for environ-
mental ﬂows. The model accounts for how stochastic weather affects market water demand,





75 million less than the baseline level for a scenario involving reallocating a
constant volume of water for the environment in both wet and dry years. For a more
realistic scenario involving more water for the environment in wet and less in dry years,




39 million. Finally, the external




1 million per annum, a








Changes to land use and river management in the Murray–Darling Basin
have led to concern over water allocation security, water quality and ecosys-
tem health (MDBC 2001). One indicator of changed river management is
that the median annual ﬂow to the sea is now only 27 per cent of the natural
(predevelopment) ﬂow (MDBMC 2002).
The Council of Australian Governments through the National Water Initi-




500 million with the intent of acquiring around
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500  GL of water for environmental ﬂows (MDBMC 2003). Conceptually,
water could be acquired through changes in the rules by which rights to
consumptive and non-consumptive use are deﬁned without compensation.
Alternatively water for the environment could be sourced through a market
mechanism. This would involve compensation for existing right holders to
relinquish consumptive use rights.
Recovering water from existing consumptive water users may involve





that the increasing environmental ﬂows would reduce the area of irrigated
agriculture. More generally, the level of impact and who is affected will depend
on how acquisition is temporally and spatially targeted, and other details of




. 2002; Brennan 2006).
Any effort to acquire water for the environment will take place in an
increasingly active market for water. Water has been tradeable independently
from land in the Murray–Darling Basin since the 1987 water-policy reforms.
A market for water in the Basin has emerged that already involves exchange
of up to 20 per cent of water allocations from some supply areas (URS 2005).
This has led to signiﬁcant spatial reallocation of irrigation in the Basin
(Bjornland 2004). Despite Commonwealth-level reforms, progress toward
completely free trade has been uneven. Signiﬁcant local and state-level





. 2006). The recent National Water Initiative is a signiﬁcant policy
push at the federal level to remove remaining impediments. Consequently,
the volume of trade in the market and the resulting extent of spatial realloca-
tion of irrigation is likely to grow over time. Conceptually, further freeing of
water trade should allow additional reallocation of water to higher value uses
and thus increase total returns to irrigation in the Basin.
Efforts to acquire water for the environment and liberalise water trade will
take place in an atmosphere of increasing concern over the rising salinity
impacts of irrigation in the Murray–Darling Basin. In many parts of the Basin
irrigation takes place over naturally saline groundwater (MDBMC 2000).
Even in the absence of trade, salinities in the Lower Murray River in South
Australia are anticipated to grow by over 200 EC to an average 800 EC by
2050 (MDBMC 2000). Water trade is likely to exacerbate river salinisation as





. 2001; URS 2005). Under the Murray–Darling Basin
Commission Agreement 1992, actions are needed to reduce salinity and its
impact on crops and water using infrastructure.
The objective of this study is to assess how agricultural sector opportunity
costs of acquiring environmental ﬂows are likely to vary depending on the
mechanism used to source water and spatial patterns of water acquisition. In
this article, a model is presented on the economics of irrigation, water trade
and resultant salinity externalities for the southern part of the Murray–
Darling Basin.
The analysis addresses ﬁve key questions: 
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1. What are the costs of acquiring water for environmental ﬂows by subregion
within the Basin?
2. How do these costs vary due to variations in rainfall, water allocation and
crop water demand?
3. Can the cost of acquiring environmental ﬂows be substantially reduced
through a targeted approach of sourcing water for environmental ﬂows
from regions where value of water in irrigated production is least?
4. Are the potential irrigated agricultural sector revenue gains from free water
trade large enough to offset the forgone opportunity cost of reallocating
500 GL of water from irrigation to the environment?
5. How does accounting for external salinity damage costs change the con-
clusions regarding the net beneﬁts of environmental water acquisition and
water trade policy in the Basin?
 
2. This study in the context of related past research
 
Several studies have addressed the issues of irrigation water overallocation
and salinity externalities in the Murray–Darling Basin. Quiggin (1988) developed
a model of the Murray River system and illustrated how different institutional
structures can affect farm land-use decisions and salinity-related problems.
Quiggin (1991) examined farm responses to mitigation works and the availabil-





. (1994) developed a spatial equilibrium model of the southern
Murray–Darling Basin and used it to estimate the effects of water trading
between regions. Several simulations were carried out using the model. They
found that unrestricted trade in water between all regions increased gross




48 million in aggregate, an increase of 4.6 per cent. The
Salinity and Landuse Simulation Analysis (SALSA) model (Bell and Heaney
2001) is a model of long-run response to water market incentives in the




. (2003) developed a model
of water trade for Victorian parts of the Basin. It is a linked series of gross
margin linear programming models – called the Water Policy Model (WPM).
The MDBC (2004) utilised the Water Policy Model and the SALSA model to
evaluate the economic and social impacts of environmental ﬂows options.
The model used in this analysis includes several important features of
actually observed responses to water market incentives that have not been
included in past analyses. Previously published Murray–Darling Basin water
market models described above have assumed average conditions inﬂuencing
water supply and demand. The model reported here includes market response
to different water availability, effective rain and irrigation requirements in
very wet, wet, average, dry and very dry years. The water availability, effective
rain and irrigation requirements are treated as states of nature and weighted
by probabilities derived from historical observations. This is important because
one signiﬁcant observed beneﬁt of freer water trade in the Murray–Darling
Basin has been signiﬁcant reallocation of water with different patterns of 
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reallocation in different years depending on annual allocation levels (Bjorn-
land 2004).
A crop water production function is included that simulates the impacts of
varying water application levels on crop yield and allows for deﬁcit irrigation.
Deﬁcit irrigation, or providing somewhat less than full crop water require-
ment and accepting somewhat reduced yields, is commonly observed response




. 2000). The past studies
outlined above have not included this possibility in that they all involved an
assumption of ﬁxed crop water requirements.
The model used in this analysis also includes a representation of the way
that the area of some irrigated crops is varied from year to year depending on
the value of water in production in comparison to its market value. It is
assumed that irrigators cannot change areas of activities requiring major
capital investments in the short-run time frame modelled. However, the area
allocated to certain types of annual crops is allowed to expand and contract
within limits. This reﬂects the practice in some parts of the Basin of holding
land and irrigation capital assets that allow greater areas of irrigated crop-
ping in years of high water allocation, and idling of this capital in years of




. 2004). Again this is an actually observed response
to water markets that has not been included in past analyses.
 
3. Analytical framework and case study
 
Thirteen catchments (also referred to as regions) in the southern part of the
Murray–Darling Basin are modelled, as shown in Figure 1. Twelve agricultural
activities that occupy most of the Murray Basin are considered including:
potatoes, vegetables, grapes, rice, oilseeds, deciduous fruits, citrus fruits, cereals,
legumes, pasture for beef, pasture for dairy and pasture for sheep.
 
3.1 Water allocation optimisation model
 
At the core of the framework is a model of irrigation response, costs and
revenue that would be expected under alternative water demand and supply
scenarios. Following the currently dominant practice, the model is a mathem-








. 2000). While there are limitations to this approach, it is still popular for
microanalysis of agricultural production and resource use because it can reli-
ably produce characterisations of real-world constrained allocation decisions
with limited data resources.
 
3.1.1 The objective function
 
The objective function of the model is to maximise the expected net revenue
from water use for irrigation subject to the constraints explained below. Each
region is treated as though it were a decision maker attempting to maxi-















































































































































































d Figure 1 Catchments of the southern Murray–Darling Basin. 
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constrained water allocation faced by the region in a speciﬁc year. Each
region chooses crops and irrigation levels, and it switches land from irriga-
tion to dryland activity if it is more proﬁtable to sell water than it is to irri-
gate. Modelled responses vary depending on rainfall, water allocation and
crop water requirement. Land and capital such as irrigation equipment is
assumed to be ﬁxed. Thus, the model estimates short-run or seasonal impacts
of varying water allocations.
The net revenue for each region for each state of nature is equal to the
aggregate revenue for the region minus variable costs and water supply




) is the sum across all


























































, water used (mL/ha).
Water charges differ from region to region, and are under review in response




. 2004). For convenience, we assume




3.2.1 Spatial and stochastic temporal water supply
 
The spatial distribution of water allocations was calculated from a combina-
tion of simulation runs from the MDBC river operations model, BigMod-MSM
(Andy Close, pers. comm. 2005) and information from Bryan and Marvanek
(2004). The MDBC model simulates allocations at each diversion point based
on simulated dam inﬂows for a run of 105 years of historical rainfall and
evaporation (1895–2000) and assuming current levels of irrigation develop-
ment. In calculating water supply across states of nature, the model accounts
for administrative water allocation rules allowing for the system capacity to
be stored and, hence, shifting of water towards drier years.
The analysis of Bryan and Marvanek (2004) provides the only available
broad scale assessment of the distribution of irrigated land and water use
in the Murray–Darling Basin though it is only for a single year. The temporal
sequence of diversions from the MDBC simulation runs is combined with
the spatial distribution of water use from the Bryan and Marvanek analysis
to calculate the cumulative distribution of allocations for each region. The
result is water allocations and crop evapotranspiration requirements for
ﬁve states of nature representing the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th and 90th per-
centile points of the simulated distribution of allocations and crop water
requirements.
Exp ob P Yld A OC A WCh A w     Pr    (         ) R sr j r j srj rj srj srj srj
j r j r j r s
=× − − ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ 
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3.2.2 Stochastic environmental ﬂows
 
The actual recommendation of the scientiﬁc panel investigating environmental-
ﬂow options for the Murray was a pattern of environmental ﬂows that varies con-
siderably across years (CRCFE 2003). This is because substantial ﬂows in the
some seasons is essential for the health of wetlands, while in other years additional
ﬂows have little value for the environment (Blackmore and Connell 1997).
Generally, additional water tends to have higher environmental value in
wet years, as it can augment already signiﬁcant capacity to inundate ﬂood-
plains, while in dry years it would be difﬁcult to create signiﬁcant inundation
even with large supplemental ﬂows. Following the principles of ‘more water
in wet and less in dry years’, ﬁve states of environmental-ﬂow allocations
with probabilities of 20 per cent each are presented in Table 1. This distribu-
tion is not based on an ecological assessment of when or where environmental
ﬂows would be required. However, the quantities of environmental ﬂows vary
in each state, in a way that is consistent with the ‘more water in wet years and
less in dry years’ principle. The expected value of water for environmental
ﬂows allocations across states of nature is 500 GL/year, in line with the agree-
ment by the government to supply 500 GL (COAG 2003).
The speciﬁcation of stochastic environmental water requirements is used in
the analysis to investigate efﬁciency gains that might result from acquiring
more water for the environment when there is high rainfall and less when
there are dry periods. The prior hypothesis is that in dry years irrigators will
seek more water for production due to less effective rainfall and high evapo-
transpiration along with cuts in their actual water allocations. Therefore, the
shadow price (or willingness to pay) for water is expected to be high in dry
years. In the wet years, the opposite condition will prevail and the shadow
price of water for irrigation is expected to be less providing greater opportunity




3.3.1 Crop water yield functions and deﬁcit irrigation
 
Crop water requirements depend on biophysical factors such as climate, soils
and crop grown. At low water application rates, additional water results in
yield increases. Beyond a certain level of water application, crop yields suffer
due to lack of aeration in the root zone and the marginal product of water
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becomes negative (de Fraiture and Perry 2002). To model crop output as a












, total quantity of water available for the crop
including irrigation water and effective rainfall, and accounting for irrigation





















































The coefﬁcients used in crop water production functions were derived by
combining ﬁeld data on yield and water requirements from Bryan and
Marvanek (2004) and the slope of the FAO crop yield response function
(Doorenbos and Kassam 1979). The FAO approach is widely used interna-
tionally and has been used in Australia, for example by Jayasuriya and Crean
(2000) and Jayasuriya (2004) who assessed the economic impacts of environ-
mental ﬂows.
Inclusion of a crop water production function allows modelling of deﬁcit
irrigation or applying less than the full crop water requirement and accepting
less than the greatest possible yield. By reducing the water use per hectare, a
greater area can be irrigated. However, the level of deﬁcit irrigation depends
on the type of crops. In general, pulses, oilseeds, cereals and grapes are tolerant
to water stress to some extent. Rice is sensitive to water stress particularly
at the ﬂowering and the second half of vegetative period (Doorenbos and
Kassam 1979). Thus, the current model allows deﬁcit irrigation subject to a
certain threshold of minimum water requirements for each agricultural
activity, as shown in Table 2.















Table 2 Minimum water requirement threshold (proportion) of full irrigation
Activity Rice
Grape, dFruit, cFruit, 
Potatoes, Vegetables†





†‘dFruit’ and ‘cFruit’ represent deciduous and citrus fruits, respectively.
‡‘pBeef’, ‘pDairy’ and ‘pSheep’ represent pasture for beef, dairy and sheep, respectively. 
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3.4 Land and water constraints
 
3.4.1 Irrigation water-use accounting and basin water constraint
 
The water availability constraints are of the general form:
(3)













, will not exceed the total















3.4.2 Irrigated land constraints
The equations for land availability constraints are of the form:
(4)
where TotLandr is the total available area for irrigation. The land constraint
ensures that for each state, s, the sum of the land areas required by regions,
r, will not exceed the total available area for irrigation for all crops, j.
3.4.3 Irrigated land use constraint and dryland constraint
These constraints are used to release irrigated land towards dryland activity
(Drylandsr) if it is not economic to irrigate, as shown in Equation (5).
(5)
The land constraint ensures that for each state, the sum of the land areas of
the crops converted to dryland and used for irrigation will be equal to the
area available for irrigation land (LandRr) in that region. The equation allows
conversion to dryland if this represents the most proﬁtable land use option
given water allocation and market conditions.
3.4.5 Temporary and permanent activity constraints
A ﬁxed land constraint (6a) is imposed on perennial cropping activities (jp)
including deciduous and citrus fruits, and grapes which involve substantial
long run capital investment and thus can neither expand nor contract in the
short-term. Temporary activities can release land for dryland activity if it is
not economically viable to irrigate. Minimum area constraints are imposed
on the temporary activities to prevent disappearance of activities with poor
economic performance. Temporary activities include oilseeds, cereals, legumes,
pasture for beef, dairy, sheep, potatoes and vegetables. Temporary activities
(jt) are allowed to take land from other temporary activities if it is econom-
ically viable to expand, as shown in Equation (6b).
wr s srj
j
srj r sr sr ∑ ≤− × − ∀ A CLoss TotWat Env    (   )             ,   1
j
srj r sr ∑ ≤∀ A TotLand         , 
Dryland LandR A sr r
j
srj sr          ,  =− ∀ ∑292 M.E. Qureshi et al.
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(6a)
(6b)
Minimum irrigated land area constraints are included because survey data
(ABARE 2003; Bryan and Marvanek 2004) reveal that some areas produce
irrigated crops even in years when this would appear to be unproﬁtable. This
may be because all resources, particularly water and labour, are not perfectly
mobile and are not imputed by their owners to the full market value of alter-
native uses assumed in analyses to date.
Constraint (6a) means that the permanent activities can only decrease water
use through deﬁcit irrigation and produce less than their maximum potential
yield. The idea is to ensure that permanent crops such as grapes cannot
expand from year to year, given that this would require signiﬁcant capital
investment which is only possible in the long-run. In contrast (6b) means that
areas of crops such as cereals can expand in high-water-availability years
using existing excess capital capacity of assets such as irrigation equipment
and land. Rice is included as a special activity which cannot expand its area
because it can only be grown in speciﬁc areas and on speciﬁc soil types (Appels
et al. 2004).
3.4.6 Allowing water trading among regions
Later in the analysis, the water constraint presented above (Equation (3)) is
relaxed. Instead a total water balance account Equation (7) is added to allow
trade of water among regions across the Basin along with ensuring that the
sum of the amount of water required by all crops j for each region, r, and
state of nature, s, will not exceed the total amount of water available (Tot-
Wats) after accounting for conveyance losses (CLossr) and allocating water
for the environmental ﬂows (Envsr) for the whole Basin. The volume of water
traded is restricted to a maximum of 40 per cent of that available. In this
short-run analysis, it is assumed that several factors will prevent greater trade,
including the capacity of individual farms to use more water in the short run
and product-market-demand constraints. Those regions which are not part
of the surface water regulated system and/or have no physical linkage with
other catchments are excluded from the interregional water trading market
(7)
3.6 Solution algorithm
A non-linear programming structure is used instead of the more common
linear programming approach because of the non-linearities involved in the
agricultural activities production functions. The model has been coded in the
General Algebraic Modelling System (GAMS) (Brooke et al. 2004).
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3.7 Modelling externality costs and beneﬁts
Water trade has potential to create both positive and negative externality
impacts. Trade into some areas where groundwater underlying irrigation areas
is naturally saline drives additional salt into the river and thus increases
salinity damage to irrigated crops and water infrastructure (MDBC 2001).
Conversely, when water is traded out of areas where high water tables are a
crop-yield-limiting factor, a positive externality can be expected as less irrigation
will tend to lower water tables and reduce consequent yield losses (Heaney
et al. 2001).
For this analysis, externality impacts of trade are analysed using a prior
assessment by Heaney et al. (2001). These authors estimated the cost of
increasing drainage by 10  000  ML/year for each subcatchment of the
Basin. Costs were evaluated on a 100-year net present value (NPV) basis
because salt loading is a consequence of drainage increases that in many
instances is delayed by several decades. One hundred year NPV values
for 10 000 ML of drainage were converted to annual values per ML. The
ﬁrst step is converting the 10 000 ML of drainage assumed by Heaney et al.
(2001) to a volume applied. This involved assuming a 15 per cent average
drainage fraction across the Basin, meaning the 10  000  ML of drainage
would result from 66 667 ML of application. Next the 100-year NPV values
estimated by Heaney et al. (2001) were converted to an annual payment
equivalent using the standard ﬁnance formula and the 5 per cent discount
rate assumed in the original analysis. The annual payment is multiplied
by  the drainage fraction to estimate the total externality impact of water
trade.
3.8 Calibration
Ideally, calibration of a model predicted outcome should be against a
number of years of observed data. The biophysical and economic data
required in the analysis came from different sources. Data on annual rainfall
and water allocation was available for several years while spatially explicit
Basin cropping pattern and crop water use data was available only for one
year: 2000–01. Therefore, predicted water use was compared to Basin water
use for 2000–01. Initially, results showed poor correspondence with areas
and water demands for each crop and for each region. The differences are
attributable to water delivery system losses and irrigation system inefﬁcien-
cies. To resolve the differences, the water supply was calibrated to predict
actual 2000–01 agricultural areas and water demands by crop and region.
The results, shown in Figure 2 indicate that by calibrating water allocation
to actual land use and estimating per hectare water use, actual response
to 2000–01 conditions could be reproduced with the model reasonably
accurately.294 M.E. Qureshi et al.
© 2007 The Authors
Journal compilation © 2007 Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd
4. Policy scenario modelling
Five policy scenarios are modelled. As shown in Table 3, each is a combination
of assumptions about the nature of water trade allowed and the mechanism
used to source water for the environment.
In the baseline scenario and in scenarios 1 and 2, it is assumed that irrigators
can only trade water within a region. This is roughly consistent with the pattern
of water that would have existed in the Basin prior to the water reforms
Figure 2 Comparison of modelled and actual areas of land uses and of water usage by region.Acquiring water for environmental ﬂows 295
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(begun in 1980s and accelerated in the mid 1990s) conﬁning water trade only
within regions and along individual river valleys. In scenarios 3 and 4, it is
assumed that water can be traded freely among all regions within the Basin
to the extent that this is physically possible. While trade amongst regions
presently occurs to some extent, institutional restrictions at State and irriga-
tion district level still preclude completely free interregional trade (Qureshi
et al. 2006). Volumes of water traded between valleys or regions are small and
interstate trades are negligible (CIE 2004). Consequently, current conditions
are somewhere between those represented with scenarios 1 and 2 (no inter-
regional trade), and scenarios 3 and 4 (completely free interregional trade).
The opportunity cost to irrigated agriculture is estimated for two environ-
mental water acquisition strategies. The environmental ﬂows acquisition
strategy modelled in scenarios 1 and 3 involves equal proportional reductions
in irrigation allocations in all regions. Scenarios 2 and 4 assess impacts of
taking water for the environment only from those regions where its value in
irrigated production is least. Water sourcing from the Mallee and Lower
Murray are precluded as water has the greatest productive value per ML in
these regions. Upper Murray, Kiewa and Wimmera–Avon are excluded from
the interregional trading market because the ﬁrst two catchments are not
part of the surface water regulated system while the last catchment has no
physical linkage with other catchments.
5. Policy modelling results
5.1 Baseline results
Table 4 presents a summary of the assumed water available, estimated water
usage, estimated expected net revenue and shadow price of water by catchment
for the baseline scenario.





Baseline No trade among regions No water sourced for 
the environment
1. Proportional water 
sourcing without 
water trade
No trade among regions Water for environment 
sourced as equal share of 
allocation from all regions
2. Targeted water 
sourcing without 
water trade
No trade among regions Water for environment sourced 
from region with lowest returns 
to irrigation water use
3. Proportional water 
sourcing with water trade
Trade among regions Same as scenario 1
4. Targeted water sourcing 
with water trade
Trade among regions Same as scenario 2296 M.E. Qureshi et al.
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In the baseline scenario, estimated total Basin water use is 6257 GL/year
while estimated total expected net revenue is #2501 million per year. As
expected, baseline results show that shadow prices of water in the Mallee and
Lower Murray regions are high (#156 and #117, respectively) as high-value
horticulture and viticulture are dominant crops. Results also show the
expected pattern of variation in water value across water-allocation years.
The estimated Basin average shadow price of water for the baseline case
varies from #42 in the lowest (10th percentile) water-allocation year to #21/ML
in the highest (90th percentile) water allocation year considered.
5.2 Environmental water sourcing and water trade modelling results
Table 5 presents results of scenarios 1–4, including estimated total water alloca-
tion and net revenue. Scenarios 1 and 2 results indicate that reduced irrigation









Total (# 000) #/ha #/ML
UMurray   20 412  20 412 10    5375 944 263
Kiewa    3543    3543 14    859 919 243
Ovens  14 768   14 768 20   11 617 1472 787
Broken  654 248  654 248 9   232 701 2064 356
Goulb   840 427  840 427 6   287 120 2388 342
Campas  132  001  132  001 12  58  529 1949 443
Loddon  799 605  799 605 12  245 081 1212 307
Avoca  104 537  104 537 22   77 036 3440 737
MRiver   853 084  853 084 33   188 563 699 221
Murrum 2 271 415 2 271 415 12   430 350 1379 189
Mallee  346 583   346 583 156   660 807 9719 1906
WimAvon  31 900   31 900 120   46 133 9308 1445
LMurray  184 335  184 335 117  256 383 9645 1388
Total 6 256 857 6 256 857 2 500 555
Table 5 Expected water use, net revenue and opportunity cost of acquiring water for water
trade and environmental policy scenarios
Scenario Base case

















(Scenario 1) (Scenario 2) (Scenario 3) (Scenario 4)
Water used (ML) 6 256 857 5 756 857 5 756 857 5 756 857 5 756 857
Net revenue (# 000) 2 500 555 2 439 999 2 466 816 2 554 447 2 556 247
Total net irrigation 
proﬁt impact (# 000)
N/A  –60 556  –33 739 +53 892 +55 692
Average net irrigation 
proﬁt impact (#/ML)
N/A    121   68   +108   +111Acquiring water for environmental ﬂows 297
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revenues relative to the baseline can be expected if an expected value of 500
GL is reallocated from irrigation to environmental ﬂows and free water trade
between regions is not allowed.
Baseline estimated irrigation revenue is #2501 million per year. Scenario 1
results show that if the environmental ﬂows were taken from across the Basin
on a pro-rata basis and interregional water trade were precluded, estimated
irrigation net revenue would be #61 million per year (2.4 per cent) less than
under baseline conditions. Comparison of scenario 2 and baseline results
indicate that revenues are estimated to decrease to be only #34 million per
year (1.4 per cent) when environmental ﬂows are taken from selected low-
value regions only. A key overall conclusion is that targeted acquisition of
environmental ﬂows in relatively low opportunity cost regions results in #27
million per year less forgone irrigation proﬁt than untargeted environmental
ﬂow acquisition through equal proportional reductions in irrigation alloca-
tions in all regions.
Comparison of scenarios 3 and 4 results with the baseline result shows that
estimated irrigation revenue gains from freeing water trade exceed estimated
revenue losses from reallocating 500 GL from irrigation for environmental
ﬂows. In scenario 3, interregional trade is allowed, and 500 GL is reallocated
from irrigation to environmental ﬂows through equal proportional reductions
in all regions. Net revenue is estimated to increase by #54 million from the
base case level of #2501 million to the scenario 3 level of #2554 million. In
scenario 4, when environmental water is acquired from low-value regions
only and free interregional water trade is allowed, a net revenue increase of
#56 million above the baseline level is estimated to result. These gains indicate
that the beneﬁt of targeting water acquisition is minimal when free water
trade is allowed.
Estimated shadow prices of water for scenarios 1 and 2 for each state of
nature are presented in Table 6. The shadow price for scenario 1 varies from
#44 to #29/ML, and #43 to #24/ML in scenario 2. Counter intuitively, shadow
prices of 90th and 70th percentile water allocation year are higher than the
shadow prices estimated in the lower water allocation 50th and 30th per-
centile allocation states. This is because the quantity of water acquired for
environmental ﬂows in 90th and 70th percentile states is much higher than
the quantity of water acquired for environmental ﬂows in 50th and 30th per-
centile states. When a uniform allocation of 500 GL of environmental ﬂows












Across the basin water 
acquisition (#/ML)
43.66 24.85 25.31 26.74 29.12
Low-value regions water 
acquisition (#/ML)
43.02 24.01 23.56 24.03 25.16298 M.E. Qureshi et al.
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per year is modelled over all ﬁve states of water allocation, the shadow price
declines with increasing water allocation as expected. The estimated shadow
price in the 10th percentile water state is #49/ML which reduces to #23/ML
in the 90th percentile water allocation year.
Values of water for irrigation estimated here are close to observations from
actual water market transactions and the ﬁndings from previous studies. For
example, the mean price of water traded on Murray Irrigation Limited’s tem-
porary water market (for the period 1998–2002) varied between #15/ML and
#40/ML. Similarly, the implied rental value of water estimated by Brennan (2002)
was #25/ML. MDBC (2004) also estimated the annual cost of water for environ-
mental ﬂows to vary between #40 and #53/ML.
When environmental water is acquired on a pro-rata basis, the net revenue
is estimated to increase from #2440 million (scenario 1 – no interregional trade)
to #2554 million (scenario 3 – interregional trade), an increase of 4.7 per cent.
When environmental water is acquired from low-value regions only, the net
revenue increases from #2467 million (scenario 2 – no interregional trade) to
#2556 million (scenario 4 – interregional trade), an increase of 3.6 per cent.
These gains are close to the net annual gains from water traded of 4.6 per
cent estimated by Hall et al. (1994). While on average these gains are small,
the beneﬁts of water trade would be large if there is a signiﬁcant reduction in
water allocations either due to severe drought or due to more demand for
environmental ﬂows. For example, when demand for environmental ﬂows is
1000 GL, the net revenue increases from #2366 million (scenario 2 – no inter-
regional trade) to #2512 million (scenario 4 – interregional trade), an increase
of 1.5 per cent in beneﬁts of water trade (i.e. from 4.7 per cent to 6.2 per cent).
The results above are for environmental water acquisition varying with the
year – less in dry years and more in wet years. Acquiring a constant 500 GL/
year is predicted to result in greater opportunity costs. For pro-rata acquisition
of water with no interregional trade, predicted net revenue is #2426 million
for constant acquisition compared to #2440 million for varying acquisition
(scenario 1). For acquisition of water from low-value regions only, predicted
net revenue is #2463 million for constant acquisition compared to #2467 million
for varying acquisition (scenario 2). Thus, the opportunity costs are greater
for constant acquisition of environmental ﬂows. Importantly, the environ-
mental outcomes of constant acquisition would also be poorer, since options
for using environmental water are less in dry years than wet.
5.3 Water trading impact on salinity
Salinity externality impacts as a result of water trade are modelled by com-
bining the estimated spatial reallocations of water with previously published
research relating irrigation drainage to salinity impact. In the analysis, both
positive and negative externalities are considered. Positive externalities result
from reductions in water allocation to regions such as Goulburn and Broken.
Here, less irrigation will lead to lower watertables, which in turn means lessAcquiring water for environmental ﬂows 299
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yield reduction from the impact of the salinity in the groundwater. Negative
externality impacts result from more water for irrigation and hence more
drainage in the Mallee and Lower Murray regions. Increased drainage leads
to more saline groundwater intrusion into the river and consequently
increases crop and infrastructure salinity damage.
Changes in volume of regional net water use relative to the base case are
shown in Table 7. Six regions increase their irrigation water use while four
regions decrease. The changes to water use are multiplied by the drainage
fraction and the annual externality costs per ML calculated from Heaney
et al. (2001) as discussed in Section 3.7 above. The results are shown in
Tables 8 and 9.
The largest externality impacts estimated are salinity damage costs in the
Lower Murray and Mallee regions which are net demanders of water. Positive
external beneﬁts from trade could be especially signiﬁcant in the Goulburn–
Broken catchments. In aggregate, the negative impacts of salinity in net demand
regions are estimated to outweigh the positive salinity impacts resulting from
net trade out of other regions.
Overall, externality impacts of water trade are estimated to be quite
modest in comparison to the value of direct revenue beneﬁts of trade. Table 9
results indicate that estimated net salinity externality costs are in the order of
#1 million per year. In contrast, comparison of scenarios 1 and 3 results indicate
that direct net revenue impacts of allowing trade are around #114 million
per annum. Gains to trade estimated through comparison of scenario 2 with
scenario 4 are #89 million.
6. Conclusions
This study used an optimisation modelling framework to estimate the cost of
sourcing environmental ﬂows from irrigation in the River Murray Basin. The
optimisation model was used to evaluate alternative policy options for water
trade and environmental ﬂows acquisition.
Table 7 Estimated average change in water use by region relative to the base case
Region









Broken –191 163 –0.29 –185 657 –0.28
Goulb –347 762 –0.41 –340 784 –0.41
Campas –6 358 –0.05 –5 231 –0.04
Loddon –89 589 –0.11 –82 650 –0.1
Avoca 26 498 0.25 27 358 0.26
MRiver 341 234 0.4 341 234 0.4
Murrum 59 079 0.03 77 445 0.03
Mallee 129 773 0.37 103 588 0.3
LMurray 72 382 0.39 58 791 0.32300 M.E. Qureshi et al.
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Table 8 Estimated salinity externality costs and beneﬁts resulting from interregional water
trade (#’000/year)
Region
100 years NPV 
for 10 000 ML 
drainage†









Goulburn-broken  130 –539 53 –526 51
Campaspe  811 –63 38 –52 32
Murray  113 341 –29 341 –29
Loddon a 2 868 –45 97 –42 89
Loddon b   333 –45 11 –42 10
Murrumbidgee  13 59 –1 77 –1
Lower Murray 7 192 72 –388 59 –318
Mallee 10 102 129 –977 103 –780
Total salinity beneﬁt 
of water traded out
199 183
Total salinity cost 





Source: the numbers in the column (†) are obtained by adding the external agricultural beneﬁts
and beneﬁts downstream of Morgan given in table 2 of Heaney et al. (2001).
Notes: ‡Water trading results either in cost or beneﬁt. Costs are indicated by negative values
while beneﬁts are indicated by positive values.
Table 9 Estimated salinity local cost or beneﬁt within region of interregional water trade
(#’000/year)
Region
100 years NPV 
for 10 000 ML 
drainage†









Goulburn-broken 1980 –539 800 –526 781
Campaspe 811 –63 38 –52 32
Murray 1437 341 –368 341 –368
Loddon a 1012 –45 34 –41.5 31
Loddon b 457 –45 15 –41.5 14
Murrumbidgee 74 59 –3 77 –4
Lower Murray 0 72 0 59 0
Mallee 0 129 0 103 0
Total salinity beneﬁt 
of water traded out
888 858
Total salinity cost 
of water traded in
–371 372
Net within region 
salinity cost
518 487
Source: the numbers in the column (†) are the internal beneﬁts given in table 2 of Heaney et al.
(2001).
Notes: ‡Water trading results either in cost or beneﬁt. Costs are indicated by negative values
while beneﬁts are indicated by positive values.Acquiring water for environmental ﬂows 301
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We  conclude that irrigation net revenue would be expected to decline if
water for the environmental ﬂows were acquired through reductions in
irrigation water allocations and free trade between regions were not allowed.
When environmental ﬂows are taken from across the Basin on a pro-rata
basis and no interregional water trade is allowed, a net irrigation revenue
decrease of #61 million per year (2.4 per cent) is estimated to result. If the
water is taken only from selected low-value regions, the cost is estimated to
be less (only #34 million per year). Thus, in the no-trade scenario, a further
conclusion is that spatially targeted water acquisition for environmental ﬂows
from low opportunity cost regions can substantially reduce costs of acquiring
environmental ﬂows.
The model accounts for the effects of stochastic weather on market water
demand, supply and requirements for environmental ﬂows. Net irrigation
revenue is estimated to be #75 million less than the baseline level for a scenario
involving reallocating a constant volume of water for the environment in
both wet and dry years. For a more realistic scenario involving more water
for the environment in wet and less in dry years, estimated net revenue loss is
reduced by #14 million.
Another key ﬁnding is that potential revenue gains to the irrigated agri-
cultural sector as a whole resulting from free water trade are large enough
to offset the revenue losses expected from reallocating 500 GL of irrigation
water to the environment. For a scenario involving interregional trade and
water taken from all the regions across the Basin, net revenue is estimated to
be #54 million (2 per cent) greater than baseline levels. Slightly greater gains
(#56 million) are estimated to result when environmental water is acquired
from low-value regions only. Thus, when free trade is allowed, there is mini-
mal gain from targeting water acquisition.
Accounting for external salinity costs does not change any of the major
conclusions of the analysis regarding the net beneﬁts of environmental water
acquisition and water trade policy in the Basin. Positive external beneﬁts are
estimated as a result of water trade in net supply regions where reduced irri-
gation is expected to result in water table level declines and consequent
improvement in yields. However, these beneﬁts are expected to be outweighed
by negative salinity externality impacts in net demand regions. The net exter-
nality impacts are estimated at around #1 million per annum which is small
relative to the aggregate ﬁnancial gains from moving to free-trade in water.
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